Spotted: cybercriminals working on new Western Union based ‘money mule management’ script


By Dancho Danchev

Risk-forwarding is an inseparable part of the cybercrime ecosystem.

Whether it’s the use of malware-infected hosts as stepping-stones, the issuing of License Agreements for your latest rootkit release stating that it’s meant to be tested against the customer’s own systems — you wish — or the selling of cheap access to verified PayPal accounts, in an attempt to mitigate the “cash-out” risk by forwarding it to a more experienced cybercriminal, the process of risk-forwarding is visible across the entire ecosystem.

In this post I’ll discuss a recently spotted Wetern Union based money mule management script. While the cybercriminals are currently developing this script, it is evidence of a cybercrime ecosystem trend focusing on the efficiency-centered standardization mentality of sophisticated cybercriminals.

More details: Continue reading

Lazy Phishers Just Email the Phishing Web Page to You, Now


By Andrew Brandt

Add to FacebookAdd to DiggAdd to Del.icio.usAdd to StumbleuponAdd to RedditAdd to BlinklistAdd to TwitterAdd to TechnoratiAdd to FurlAdd to Newsvine

20091026_bofa_phish_withatt_cropIt was a particularly busy weekend for spammers, especially the creepy, evil ones who are trying to steal information (as opposed to the merely scungy pill vendors and their ilk). Webroot’s Threat Research team has recently seen a glut of phishing messages which, like most, purport to come from banks and ask you to update your account information. But unlike most phishing messages, which contain a link to a Web site, these phishing messages include an attached HTML file which, in essence, puts the phishing page right on your hard drive.

When launched, the HTML file renders a sparse but effective phishing form in the browser. The pages warn the victim that “This account has been temporarily suspended for security reasons” and ask the victim to “confirm that you are the rightful owner of this account” — by providing the “bank” with a wide range of personally identifiable information they should already have, and never would ask you to provide through a Web-based form in the circumstances described in the message.

20091026_bofa_phish_form_clean_cropThese pages also pull graphics from the banks’ Web sites–activity that, when it comes from a phishing site hosted on a server not belonging to the targeted bank, typically alerts the banks to phishy behavior. Because the graphics are loaded only once, from the desktop of the targeted victim, the banks can’t put a stop to it before it’s too late.

Continue reading