Largely thanks to the increasing availability of easy to use DIY (do-it-yourself) DDoS bots, we continue to observe an increase in international cybercrime-friendly market propositions for ‘DDoS for hire’ services. And whereas these services can never match the bandwidth capabilities and vendor experience offered by their Russian/Eastern European counterparts, they continue to empower novice Internet users with the ability to launch a DDoS attack against virtually anyone online.
In this post, I’ll profile a recently launched marijuana themed DDoS for hire service and emphasize on how, despite it’s built in pseudo-anti abuse process, the service is prone to be abused by novice cybercriminals looking for cost-effective ways to cause disruption online.
Over the past week, the cybercriminals behind the recently profiled ‘Citibank Merchant Billing Statement‘ themed campaign, resumed operations, and launched yet another massive spam campaign impersonating Citibank, in an attempt to trick its customers into executing the malicious attachment found in the fake emails.
Our sensors recently picked up a Web site infection, affecting the Web site of the Ministry of Micro And Medium Enterprises (MSME DI Jaipur). And although the Black Hole Exploit Kit serving URL is currently not accepting any connections, it’s known to have been used in previous client-side exploit serving campaigns.
Let’s profile the campaign, list the malicious URLs, associate them with previously launched malicious campaigns, and provide actual MD5s for historical OSINT preservation/attribution purposes.
We have just intercepted yet another currently ongoing malicious spam campaign, enticing users into executing a fake Export License/Payment Invoice. Once gullible and socially engineering users do so, their PCs automatically join the botnet operated by the cybercriminals.
With more Web-based DIY malware crypterscontinuing to pop up online, both novice and experienced cybercriminals can easily obfuscate any malicious sample into an undetected — through signatures based scanning not behavioral detection — piece of malware, successfully bypassing perimeter based defenses currently in place.
In this post I’ll profile a recently launched service, empowering virtually everyone using it, with the capability to generate undetected malware. I’ll emphasize on its key differentiation factors and provide sample MD5s known to have been crypted using the service.
Trust is vital. It’s also the cornerstone for the growth of E-commerce in general, largely thanks to the mass acceptable of a trusted model for processing financial data and personally identifiable information. For years, the acceptance and mass implementation of PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) has been a driving force that resulted in a pseudo-secure B2C, B2B, and B2G electronic marketplace, connecting the world’s economies in a 24/7/365 operating global ecosystem.
The gang of cybercriminals behind the ‘Magic Malware‘ has launched yet another malicious spam campaign, attempting to trick U.K users into thinking they’ve received a notification for a “New MMS” message. In reality, once users execute the malicious attachment, it will download and drop additional malware on the affected hosts, giving the cybercriminals behind the campaign complete access to the affected host.
Bitcoin, the digital peer-to-peer based currency, is an attractive target for cybercriminals, who persistently look for new monetization tactics to apply to their massive, but easily generated botnets. Not surprisingly, thanks to the buzz surrounding it, fraudulent Internet actors have begun to look for efficient ways to take advantage of the momentum. A logical question emerges – how are market oriented cybercriminals capitalizing on the digital currency?
Instead of having to personally infect tens of thousands of hosts, some take advantage of basic pricing schemes such subscription-based pricing, and have others do all the infecting, with them securing a decent revenue stream based on a monthly subscription model.
Let’s profile the international underground market proposition, detailing the commercial availability of a stealth Bitcoin miner, feature screenshots of the actual DIY miner generating tool, screenshots provided by happy customers, and perhaps most importantly, MD5s of known miner modifications ‘pushed’ since its first commercial release.
On the majority of occasions, Cybercrime-as-a-Service vendors will sell access to malware-infected hosts to virtually anyone who pays for them, without bothering to know what happens once the transaction takes place.
A newly launched E-shop for malware-infected hosts, however, has introduced a novel approach for calculating the going rate for the hacked PCs. Basically, they’re selling actual malicious binary “executions” on the hosts that the vendor is managing, instead of just selling access to them.
A diversified international underground market proposition? Check. A novel approach to monetize malware-infected hosts? Not at all. Let’s profile the actual market proposition, and discuss in-depth why its model is flawed by design.
In 2013, Liberty Reserve and Web Money remain the payment method of choice for the majority of Russian/Eastern European cybercriminals. Cybercrime-as-a-Service underground market propositions, malware crypters, R.A.Ts (Remote Access Trojans), brute-forcing tools etc. virtually every underground market product/service is available for purchase through the use of these ubiquitous virtual currencies.
What’s the situation on the international underground market? Next to accepting PayPal and consequently all major credit cards, we’ve been observing an increase in market propositions starting to accept Bitcoins. Is this a trend or a fad, and does the currency’s P2P model about to be embraced ecosystem-wide due to its (current) pseudo-anonymous model?